Space-Cyber Governance
governance in the beyond
PIs: Eytan Tepper, Jean-Frédéric Morin, Robert G. Mazzolin
Space-based infrastructure is a critical infrastructure for security and the economy – in fact to most aspects of modern lives – and is, therefore, a prime target. Only a handful of countries has the capabilities to physically destroy satellites – and be exposed as the perpetrators. A cyber-attack, on the other hand, has a low entry barrier in terms of required funds and technological and engineering capabilities. Moreover, the attacker can cover its tracks, leaving the attacked country perplexed. Cyber-attacks will therefore be the leading method of targeting space-based infrastructure by States as well as non-State actors, notably criminal organizations, and terrorist groups. Such attacks already occurred by States and even terrorist organizations. Indeed, a combined space-cyber warfare theatre has emerged to become the primary battlefield for global powers in the 21st century. Harvard’s Belfer center suggested that the first mission of the new US Space Force should be cybersecurity of space assets. A series of Chatham House studies found that there is an ‘escalatory cycle’ of militarization of the space-cyber realm which meets inadequate national policies and global governance, and the development of a flexible, multilateral regime is urgently required.
Whereas a space-cyber theater has already emerged, the governance is still separated. The UN works in two separate channels and there are the Tallinn Manual on the international law applicable to cyber warfare on the one hand and the MILAMOS and Woomera manuals on the international law applicable to space warfare. The project will explore the feasibility of building on the two in order to introduce an integrated guide to the governance of space-cyber warfare.